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This paper is a reply to Michael Coleman's recent article in American 
Studies in Scandinavia ('Response to a Postmodernist: Or, a Historian's 
Critique of Postmodernist Critiques of History')' which, because he's 
raising in it both general arguments against the (apparent) claims of post-
modern historians as well as specific instances of where I personally 
seem to have got things hopelessly wrong, is in two parts. Jn the first I 
want to address just a few of the more typical arguments which keep 
appearing against postmodern historians and 'hi story theorists' which, at 
this point, ought to come to a halt; they just don' t have any purchase any 
more (if they ever did!). This is not because the postmodernists targeted 
are no longer paying attention (though most have probably got better 
things to do than rebut generally ill-informed, swingeing critiques), nor is 
it because the exchanges which actually do take place have become 
repetitive, familiar and unproductive (though there may be an element of 
this as the two 'sides' are said lo Lalk pas l each ull1er), bul because one 
'side' of the debate - the postmodern - has won the day; is so convincing 
that the location and the terms of any remaining worthwhile discussion 
about the ' nature of history today' can only now take place within the 
framework(s) established by postmodernists and not between 'mod-
ernists and postmodernists'. If only empirically and epistemologically 
I. Michael Coleman, "Response tn a Postmodernist: or, A Historian's Critique of Postmodernist Critiques 
of History" in American S111dies in Scandinavia, 34, l , Spring 2002, pp. 47-64. 
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minded historians, if only Coleman had noticed, they/he would have 
realised that the reason they may feel they're talking to themselves is 
because the 'debates' have moved on, leaving them behind. And in the 
second part of this paper, as already suggested, I want to deal directly 
with Coleman's specific complaints against me insofar as they are not 
effectively covered in the general response I will have made in the first. 
PART ONE 
(1) On Generalities 
One of the many general complaints made by Colemanists (he is in many 
ways so typical of mainstream academic historians that the collective 
noun is not inappropriate) about the sometime engagement between 
modernist and postmodernist historians (or, as it is often pejoratively put 
by Colemanists, between historians as such and mere ' theorists'), is that 
the two sides take up such extreme and/or uncompromising positions that 
the resultant polarisation negates the possibility of dialogue: straw per-
sons face straw persons. What would therefore be better (claim Coleman-
ists) is that such unhelpful postures are dropped and, as 'rational' people, 
we find some common 'middle ground ' where, in a mutually respectful 
and productive atmosphere, 'we ' settle our differences and work together 
for what is surely our joint objective: to consider that constitutes the dis-
course of history nowadays in ways conducive to the establishment of 
verifiable historical knowledge so to help the continuation of those 
vibrant historians contemporary social formations so much need. And I 
want to say, against this, that such a middle ground no longer exists - and 
nor should it. And my reasons for saying this involve at least the fol-
lowing .. . 
(2) Against the Middle Ground 
Because the past (all that has happened everywhere 'before now') and 
histories (synoptic accounts, interpretive syntheses, etc ., which appear at 
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the level of the text) are of a categorically different kind, then to under-
stand what histories most plausibly seem to be we have to necessarily 
place them under - and read them through - the idea(s) of representation 
and presentation. And, on the basis that the etymology of representation 
most plausibly suggests substitutionali sm, then we might best understand 
historians representations/ presentations - histories - precisely as substi-
tutes, as things which stand in for absent objects in a relationship which 
can only be metaphorical: this representation/painting of a vase of 
flowers as if it were a vase of flowers ; this text as ~l it was the past or 
some aspect of the past. And this difference between the two objects so 
expressed is, again, the difference between two totally different phe-
nomena, and so is a permanent and thus ontological one: there is no way 
that a historical representation/presentation of the past could ever be ' the 
past' otherwise it would not be a history; no way that a painting of a vase 
of flowers could ever be a vase of flowers otherwise it wouldn ' t be a 
painting. The only way that the 'before now' can meaningfully enter -
transformed- into our consciousness as history, then, is by way of a ' tex-
tual' substitution (irrespective of the technical medium) in the mode of 
metaphor. 
Now, all thi s is pretty basic stuff and fairly well recognised. But the 
quite devastating logical conclusion of reading things this way is rarely 
drawn by Colemanists. Not surpiisingly. For if it is then at the level of 
history - at the level of the text which is always more than the level of the 
statement, the annal, the chronicle - what is definitively ruled out is the 
possibility that history has ever been, or ever will be, an epistemology. 
For within the problematic of epistemology, the form(s) and the con-
tent(s) which consti tutes the possibility of epistemological claims (claims 
to an objectively verifiable knowledge beyond peradventure), that of cor-
respom.Jence anti tlescripliuu, are nut available al the level uf the lext, at 
the level of histories. This is because the text (as the embodiment of the 
figurative, the inescapably aesthetic) is always more than - and thus is 
irreducible to - c01Tespondence and desciiption: the historicised past is 
always that of the imagined figure. 
Again, it is easy to see why this is the case, but a reiteration of some 
basic points may dispel any remaining doubts. Thus, to get into this via a 
discussion of singular statements and complete(d) texts, we might say 
that once the world (and worlds past) has been 'put under a description' 
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(a scheme) then, relative to that description it is possible (by virtue of 
coherence, consistency and thus correspondence between phenomenal 
actuality and language which gives us, once language has constituted the 
actuality of a phenomena as a linguistic 'reality', that problematic of 
world and relationships we 'know' as 'our ' world) .. . it is possible to 
make ' true' statements about such a self-referencing reality. Of course. 
But what holds for statements (albeit perilously on many occasions) 
never bolds for texts which, in their ineradicable figural aestheticism, are 
not objects that can be proven or falsified, made true or false, before the 
tribunal of knowledge, of epistemology. 
The Dutch philosopher of his tory Frank Ankersmit has explained all 
this, and its consequences, better than most.2 For Ankersmit, historian 's 
texts (and by extension texts qua texts) consist of many individual state-
ments most of which give an accurate description of some state(s) of 
affairs which took place 'before now' . These 'evidential statements' are 
extracted from the archive and have about them, when corroborated (on 
ultimately arbitrary criteria operating by courtesy of a sometime con-
sensus at the 'research phase' of the historian's work) the aura of fac-
ticity, a facticity which comes to the surface as one element of the text 
replete with 'cuffent' notions of scholarly apparatus but in ways which 
suggest that what is being presented here not just in these statements but 
in the whole text is the past - or some aspect of the past - as such. And 
here Ankersmit makes a first qualification. For obviously nobody li ter-
ally accesses the past as such, and nobody nowadays seriously takes the 
view that history as a discourse is committed to the re-covery of the past 
in some sort of pre-discursive state. The historicised past is clearly 
'always already' textual , such that a11 that there has ever been and ever 
can be at issue is what can be drawn intertextually from the generic 
archive, it being these traces which function as the historians ultimate 
referent for statements but not, crucially, for texts. Moreover, with the 
possible exception of areas of the 'before now ' with an almost non-exis-
tent archival record, the evidential traces and thus the evidential 'true' 
statements available allows historians to write many more such state-
2. F. R. Ankersmit discusses most of the issues considered in this reply in his many publications, but never 
better than in his most recent book, Histurical Representation (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 200 I). 
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ments than are ever included in their texts. It is sometimes argued that 
postmodernists deny that there are any such things as 'facts' and this is 
accurate in the sense that such 'facts' have to be given that status by much 
investigation, designation, interpretation, and so on. But that work done, 
it is not then a matter of there being no facts but that there are millions of 
them. Consequently, it is this situation which makes the anti-postmodern 
stance of such representative Colemanists as Christopher Norris appear 
absurd. Thus Norris rehearses a near-universal complaint when he writes 
that there is, 
a certain postmodernist way of thinking about history which goes roughly as follows. 
History is a fic tive construct, a selective, partial, ideologically inflected view of the 
past. There is no historical truth ... but always a variety of different, competing and 
strictly incommensurable claims about every significant historical event. Of those 
aspects of postmodernism T would want to resist, this is the one that most urgently 
needs resisting for the obvious reason that it opens the way for all manner of 'revisio-
nist' distortions or suppressions of historical fact. The worst example, of course, is the 
revision ist approach that seeks to play down or to rclativise what happened in Nazi 
Germany and elsewhere during the years of the Holocaust. .. [Here] getting things right 
in the face of competing ideological or politically motivated claims - is a matter of the 
utmost importance.3 
Now, this really is a gift. For it would be interesting if Norris (et al) could 
actually demonstrate how any hist01ian writing at the level of the text 
was not doing som ething .fictive (not 'fictional' - a slippage between fic-
tive and fictional appeari ng regularly in anti-postmodern writing) but.fic-
tive, in the sense that to create an account of the 'before now' in say, a 
narrative form when the phenomenon under investigation did not have a 
nanative form, is precisely what is meant here by fictive; namely, some-
thing made up, fabricated, fashioned, shaped, figured, fabular: f ictio. It 
would also be interesting if Norris could suggest - given that no account 
can ever be either logically or contingently exhaustive - an 'account' that 
is not necessarily a selection. And it would be interesting indeed to know 
if what is being presented via selective procedures that are not express-
ible as a universal or algorithmic method (for history knows of no defini-
tive methodology) could escape from being partial and, in the end given 
3. Christopher Norris. "Defending De1Tida" in '/he Plti/osoplters ' Magazine, Autumn, 2002, pp. 4 1-43. This 
short 'defense' was part or a series of talks on postmodcrnism held in London in 2002. Norris has written 
extensively, and repetitively, on the clangers orpostmodern ism. 
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no definitive historical method, arbitrary. And it would be amazing if 
Norris knows anyone who writes histories - including himself - outside 
of the ethical/moral/ideological/poli tical set of assumptions and desires 
that give them and him their own distinctive positions; their personal sig-
natures. And it would be not only amazing but absolutely original if 
Norris could show exactly how, at the level of meanings, of interpretive 
signjficances which are incommensurable - as in the case of different 
tropings and emplotments of, to use Norris ' own example, the Holocaust 
- that such incommensurable positions could be resolved by reference to 
the facts as if value was logically entailed from them; as if it were ever 
possible to logica11y transit uni-equivocally from historical syntax to 
semantics. For the point about revisionism in general is that whilst there 
could conceivably be agreement about all the facts of the matter there can 
be no entailed agreement about what they might signify. Consequently, 
until Norris (et al) can show both in terms of a specific instance and gen-
eral applicability how you derive values from facts, then no matter how 
much he bemoans the distinction it won' t go away. Of course nobody is 
denying, least of all Ank:ersmit or me, that it is possible to get at the level 
of the statement/descriptive phrase regimes, 'facts', and nobody is 
denying that such evidential phenomena can constrain the range of 
descriptive possibilities such that, for example, the denial of the Holo-
caust in the light of the weight of corroborated traces is absurd. Moreover 
- and somewhat in passing - I know of no single postmodernist who is a 
Holocaust denier - and I doubt if Norris or anyone else does ! But what 
cannot follow from alJ this is that we definitively know what the Holo-
caus t means. And it is this 'fact' that gives weight to Ankersmit's point 
that since the past per se has no intrinsic meaning of its own in it, then no 
correspondence between the past and the meanings we ascribe to it are 
available . Which is also why he thinks that ' representations' are better to 
be thought of as 'presentations'; as proposals for ways of thinking about 
and thus imagining the shape of things past in the present. For we can 
now immediately see the problem of trying to verify as objective or true 
any such proposal given that the past itself does not have in it proposals 
of its own for any proposal to be checked agai nst. Ankersmit thus con-
cludes his analysis in ways easily rebutting Norri s's position: saying 
'true' things at the level of the statement is relatively easy - anybody can 
do that - but saying ' true' things at the level of the meaning-full text is 
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impossible - nobody can do that. And this is why his slogan - the state-
ment is modernist, the text is postmodernist - is so apt. For given that his-
tory - to be a history (rather than a list, a chronicle, etc.) is always in 
excess of the sum of its parts - any histmi an (Coleman, N01Tis ... ) who 
remains anti-textural, and therefore anti-postmodern, is just plain passe. 
It is for these sorts of reasons that I think Hayden White and Jacques 
De1Tida ought not to be castigated by Colernanists - as they typically are 
- but rather that their theories about historical representations/presenta-
tions be embraced as 'the only game in town ' . After the above comments 
on Ankersmit there is perhaps little need to yet again rehearse White's 
position on the inexpungeable relativism of all historical readings. But 
within the literature on White - and I mention this because of Norris' 'oh-
so-typical' use of the Holocaust as the ' test case' against postmodern rel-
ativism - I want to insist, again in passing, that White has never revised 
his relativist position despite near unanimous claims that he has done so, 
an accusation which suggests that, in his 'revisionism', he has 'cut the 
heart out of his philosophy'. And thi s is important to discuss, I think, 
because it helps underline the ' relativistic' points I am trying to make so 
that if Coleman(ists) wish to try and rebut them they know precisely the 
'proposal' they have to engage with . 
Thus, in his 'Historical Emplotment and the Problem Truth in Histor-
ical Representation' 4, White questions whether, with respect to historical 
emplotments, there are any limits to the type that might properly be used 
or if 'anything goes' . And his answer is that ultimately 'anything goes '. 
For we could only presume that ' the facts of the matter' set limits to the 
sorts of stories/narratives we can tell if we believe that the events them-
selves have in them a latent story form and a definitive, knowable plot 
structure. In which case - if they did - then we could indeed dismiss, say, 
a comic or pastoral story 'from the ranks of competing narratives as man-
ifestly false to the facts - or at least to the facts that matter - of the Nazi 
era' .s But of course they don't. For as White says elsewhere 'one must 
4. Hayden White, "Historical Emplotmcnt and the Problem of Truth in Historical Representation" Figural 
l?ealis111 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) pp. 27-42. White's essay has appeared in many 
places, most 'usefully', perhaps, for this d iscussion, in Saul Frcidlandcr 's Pmhillfl tile Li111i1s of l?epre.w11a-
tin11 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992). 
5. !bid, p. 30. 
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face the fact that when it comes to apprehending the historical record, 
there are no grounds :to be found in the historical record itself for prefer-
ring one way of construing meanings over another' .6 
Thus why the confusion; White's position seems clear enough? Why is 
it that historians like Saul Freidlander, Martin Jay and umpteen others, 
have insisted that White qualifies/subverts his relativism here? And the 
reason seems to be that White suggests that we might indeed be justified 
in appealing to ' the facts' in order to dismiss competing nanatives of the 
Third Reich if they were to be em plotted in a comic or pastoral mode. But 
- and thi s is the big but - this attempted 'appeal' could only be an 
attempt; it could never succeed because of the fact-value dichotomy. 
And, in fact, White has himself recently refuted those who have read this 
attempt as the undercutting of his own long-term relativism. Thus, in his 
recent article, 'An Old Question Raised Again ', he refers to his earlier 
article to say the following: 
Herc T considered the question of whether one could endow the events of the Holocaust 
wi th all the meaning that the vad ous modes of emplotment known to Western practices 
of narrativisation provide. And I made two remarks. One had to do with the relation 
between facts and meanings. I said that when it comes to imputing meaning to a given 
set of historical events the facts cannot be appealed to in the same manner they can be 
appealed to in order to determine the truth-value of specific statements made about spe-
cific events. I refen-ed to meaning, not trnth. The second remark had to do with the 
question of whether the Holocaust could be freely emplotted ... including those [em-
plotrnents] of comedy and farce. I did not say that the facts precluded the emplotment 
of the Holocaust as a farce; I said [onlyl that it would be tasteless and offensive to most 
audiences to so emplot it I invoked moral and aesthetic crited a, not facts, as determi-
native of the choice of the plot structu re to be used in the narrativisation of the Holo-
caust.7 
For White, then, it remains our moral/aesthetic choice to invest the facts 
with whatever meaning we wish. To be sure, certain investments may be 
(and indeed are) offensive, but the point remains that offence is not 
enough to undermine the fact-value dichotomy - and thus inexpungeable 
moral relativism for ever. And so to Norris and fellow Colemanists I 
6. The Po litics of Historical Interpretation, 71ie Conte/// of rhe Form (Raltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1987) p. 75. 
7. Hayden White, "An Old Question Ra ised Again: l s Historiography Ari or Science? (Response to l ggers)" 
Rethinking Ni.1101)>, 4, 3, 2000, pp. 391 -406, p. 402. 
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repeat that what they have to do is not to keep on saying that it is ethi-
cally/morally repugnant to be able to logically emplot the Holocaust 
'anyway you like', but to show how they can actually logically expunge 
such ' inexpungeable relativism' at the level of textual meaning. 
And here I move from White to Derrida. For while as a citizen and a 
man of the left (and of course as a Jew), Derrida can and does reject 
Nazism/neo-Nazism/anti-Semitism, etc., in terms of the logic of decon-
struction not only are we always able to decide how to make anything 
ultimately mean whatever we want it to mean but that, on the whole, this 
is considered to be a good thing. And this is because for Derrida all eth-
ical/moral/political decisions have to go through the aporia of the deci-
sion; of ' the undecidability of the decision' . 
For for Derrida, for a decision to actually be a decision, it must be 
more than the application of a previous rule or command or legal code. 
For if I am to do justice to any judgement I might make about an event 
which comes to me - as events always do - in ways which have never 
quite occurred before (be they ever so familiar) then this new event must, 
in all its singularity, be judged in ways that are precisely not the re-appli-
cation of any previous decision. Because if I were to apply again a deci-
sion derived from a previously worked out formula (or from ' the lessons 
of history' construed as some form of necessity) then I would merely be 
carrying out an administrative act and thus no decision will have been 
made. A decision worthy of its name, then, occurs in a situation of radical 
undecidability, at a moment temporarily outside of all ethics, all morality, 
and so necessarily involves an element of invention. Of course, I can 
never actually make - nor has anyone ever made - a pure, new decision 
like that; all decisions have their newness contaminated by one's pre-
vious decision-making experience no matter how much one tries to forget 
it. Moreover, there is a sense in which, when making a decision, l always 
have to remember at least something for, as DetTida points out, the deci-
sion must 'deliver itself over to the impossible decision while taking 
account of rules and laws' - otherwise it would be so radically 'other' as 
to be incomprehensible. Yet, nevertheless, it must still be a decision 
beyond 'all certainty or all alleged criteriology ' : 
Undecidable - this is the experience of that which, though foreign and heterogeneous to 
the order or the calculable and the rule, must nonetheless .. . deliver itself over to the 
impossible decision while taking account of law and rules. A decision that wou ld not go 
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through the test and ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision; it would 
only be the programmable application or the continuous unfolding of a ca lculable pro-
cess. ft might perhaps be legal; it would not be just.R 
From which summary one can conclude that that which has to be avoided 
at all costs is some sort of evaluative closure. Accordingly, it seems emi-
nently sensible to 'conclude' that it really is excellent news that eth-
ical/moral decision are always unfixed, always non-totalisable. It is a 
good thing that there is an unbridgeable gulf between fact and value; that 
the 'opening' to an ethical/moral decision is always a ' non-ethical 
opening to ethics ' , for in these ways the future of 'future decisions' is 
always open. Accordingly, this way of looking at things allows us to draw 
together the decisional aestheticism of Ankersmit, the relativism of 
White and the radical undecidability of Derrida in ways which undercuts 
foundational, meaning-full 'knowledge', and which opens up a space 
which, as Geoffrey Bennington puts it, 'might reasonably be called polit-
ical insofar as it makes judgements necessary whilst disallowing any full 
cognitive grasp or possible programming of that judgement'. 
So the challenge to Coleman(ists) is, once again, that they stop 
wringing their hands over ethical and moral relativism and to show, if 
they cannot go along with the generous open logic of Derrida et al, both 
where Derrida et al have got it wrong and, vis a vis their own anti-foun-
dationalism, demonstrate how exactly foundations can be established and 
worked. The challenge to Coleman(ists) is that he/they engage directly 
with the above sort of arguments and rebut them point by point (not by 
slurs, pejorative slights, ad hominem dismissals ... ) but philosophically; 
theoretically. This is an open invitation for Coleman et al to try. 
To bring this first part to a tentative conclusion, let me now sum up, in 
four short paragraphs, the upshot of the preceding discussion before 
turning to engage with some of Coleman's specific charges against me. 
8. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority"' in Acts of Religion (London, 
Routledge, 2002) pp. 228-298, p. 252. 
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(3) Four Conclusions 
It can now be seen that critics of postmodern histories generally pose to 
its proposers the kind of questions which are now utterly redundant. 
Those are questions which, no matter how put, all boil down to concerns 
about objectivity, disinterest, truth and relativism which, further boiled 
down, effectively take the following familiar form: if histories are aes-
thetic, figurative discourses without foundations, then what happens to 
the pursuit of truth at the end of enquiry? My answer is to say that if the 
notion of the aesthetic is understood then nobody could possibly ask this 
epistemological question any longer. There is no point. And this is for the 
inescapable reason that it is no good expecting an aesthetic mode. to 
answer an epistemological question. For the difference between these 
two categories is an onto logical one; epistemologies and aestheticisations 
are different not in degree but in kind. And this explai ns why the break 
between moderni st and postmodernist histories (the first wanting - but 
not achieving epistemological status - the latter not bothering) is not, as 
things stand, an epistemological break (which seems to allow for the pos-
sibili ty that one day they might be unified and the break 'healed over '), 
but a permanent because inconunensurable difference. 
Second, it therefore follows that it's really no good thinking that post-
modern insights - into language, representation , nan-atology, etc . - can 
be somehow grafted on to modernist histories which might thus allow 
them to overcome 'postist' critiques and so survive not only intact but 
strengthened. For this is not possible; the break between modernity and 
postmodernity is as epochal, and as fundamental, I propose, as that 
between the medieval and the modern, and it is as inconceivable to think 
that modernists will be able to long sm vive in postmodernity (with their 
vocabularies, lexicons, axioms, etc.) any more than 'the medieval' might 
survive as if unaffected in modernity: these are differently constituted 
'worlds'. It is also, I think, a mistake for academic historians to think that 
postmodernists want their kind of pseudo-epistemological histories -
their epistemological fallacies - to continue, and that they might even 
want to help them do so. It is understandable that academic historians, 
mistaking their own time-space bound genre for ' the real thing ', can see 
no alternative to their cun-ent practices, but postmodernists can and do 
and such inventive sightings signal the end of one type of history and the 
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beginning - perhaps - of others, as yet embryonic. Postmodernity offers 
new births. 
Third, from a postmodern perspective, this unavoidable break is a break 
which, though understandable 'historically' is, logically, a break that 
should never have been made. For if postmodern claims vis a vis what is 
arguahly the best way of characterising histori es - as aesthetic, figurative 
discourses - are correct, then it is not that postmodern histories alone are 
examples of an aestheticisation of the past which then stand over against 
modernist ones which just happen not to be aestheticisations. For if his-
tory as such is an aesthetic, then it always has been and always will be; 
there cannot be histories qua histories of any other type. All histories -
past, present, fu ture - are thus of the aesthetic type postmodernists raise to 
the level of consciousness. Which is another way of saying that postmod-
ernist histories are and always have been ' the only game in town'. So that 
in coming to the end of epistemological attempts to historicise the past we 
have, as it were, come home to ourselves. And so let us accept this home-
coming, thi s happiest of thoughts which at this point can be thrown into 
the wake: epistemological claiming histories just ought never to have 
existed; histories j ust ought never to have been modern. 
Finally, we can surely now see why we are witnessing the disappear-
ance of ' the middle ground'. For if, as I said at the beginning, one pole of 
the polar difference between modernist and postmodernist histories col-
lapses such that we are now all postmodern aestheticisers, then there is no 
middle ground left to occupy. So that to those who still think that history 
is or could be an epistemology rather than a reflexive, aesthetic, figural, 
refractive, discursive experiment without foundations - and that to it 
postrnodernisrn makes no difference - all I can say, finally, is ' think about 
it'. And then relax; and then go with it. I mean why not ... you have 
nothing to lose but your pasts. 
PART TWO 
This is not the first time that Coleman has ' replied' to a postmodern his-
torian/theorist. In 1998, in the pages of American Quarterly, he attacked 
Robert Berkhofer 's Beyond The Great Story ('Gut Reactions of a Histo-
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rian to a Missionary Tract').9 And it is interesting to note that not only 
have Coleman's arguments not developed over the last four years but that 
his characterisation of himself as the plain, simple, straight-talking ' real ' 
hist01ian and Berkhofer as some zealous (and thus irrational, confused 
and fundamentali st) 'missionary', is repeated in his 'historians' critique 
of my own deluded, postmodern position: once again the 'real thing' 
attacks the fake, the quasi-historian, the stupid ' theorist '. 
But in fact the ' real thing' is in poor shape, as is its defense, Coleman's 
arguments - if such they are - being a mix of unsustainable assertions 
and confusions stirred with ad hominem slights and the plaintive cries of 
an allegedly much-misunderstood, wounded animal. The only real differ-
ence between Coleman 's two polemical pieces is that in Berkhofer 's case 
he has conveniently tabulated his arguments whereas, in mine, things are 
just jumbled up. And so, taking a leaf out of his own book, I want to 
myself tabulate Coleman's points so that I can deal with them one by one: 
there are six of them. 
(1) Objective Histories 
Whilst Coleman admits that an objectively true history is impossible (p. 
50), nevertheless, he argues that historians must retain the claim that they 
can provide 'varying degrees of credibility' in constructing the historical 
past. Unfortunately, it is not very clear what Coleman means by 'credi-
bility', but if what he has in mind is the production of historical facts of 
the level of the statement as if 'history' was reducible to that, then all the 
arguments from Ankersmit apply. And, incredible though it may seem, it 
looks as if this actually is what Coleman means. For could any scholar, he 
says, claim that the fol lowing two stori es are equally credible: '(1 ) From 
the late fifteenth century Europeans began to colonize the Americas. (2) 
From the late fifteenth century, Aztecs and other peoples of the Americas 
began to colonize Europe' .1° From which example Coleman argues that 
9. Michael Coleman, "Gut Reactions of a Historian to a Missionary Tract" American Quarterly, 50, 2, June 
1998, pp. 340-348. 
I 0. Michael Coleman, "Response to a Postmodernist ... "op cit, p. 50. 
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whilst it is one thing to reach one objectively true reconstruction of the 
past, this example shows that the (postmodern) claim that ' all stories are 
equally credible or incredible' (p. 50) is quite another. 
There are several points here. First - and very briefl y given what has 
been said already - it beggars belief that Coleman doesn' t recogni se - or 
if he does then ar:t on the recognition - that a history is more than the sum 
of its factive/cognitive elements, and that, therefore, the 'credibility ' of 
cognitive elements does not equate to the credibility of narrative order-
ings which may include them but which are irreducible to them. But I 
have to conclude that Coleman doesn't recognise this - otherwise how 
could he have given the example he has? 
But if Coleman's argument won't work - and it obviously won't - then 
it would seem that postmodernists are right to claim that all narratives are 
equally credible or incredible and that, therefore, anything goes. And log-
ically this does seem to follow; as we have seen in our discussion of 
White and Norris, fact and value, syntax and semantics do indeed float 
free of each other, only contingently (and pragmatically) being 'con-
nected' but never entailed. Nevertheless, in the above discussion of 
White and Norris - and indeed Ankersmit - the attention I have g iven to 
the ' true' statement (and which I always give) should have cautioned 
Coleman from rushing to the 'anything goes' logical conclusion as if 
there was nothing to take the attitude of 'anything goes' about. This 
'qualification' of a kind - and it is for many postmodernists 'of a kind' -
thus needs to be considered so that the un-nuanced 'version' of Coleman 
can be corrected. 
No postmoderni st I know of, then, thinks that a text - and by extension 
the historicised past as text - can in the actuality of its existence be about 
absolutely anything, or can be read in complete disregard of 'the words 
on the page' (or the 'historical syntax'). Rather, postmodernists argue (in 
the manner of Derrida) that whilst no 'reading' of a text can make itself 
absolutely necessary (hence the logic of 'anything goes'), in fact no 
existing text can in practice open itself up to just any reading - otherwise 
the reading wouldn' t be about that text. No, what texts do is to appeal for 
a reading; what the historical past as a text does is to call out for an 
appropriative gaze, otherwise there wouldn 't be a reading but only a pas-
sive decipherment - which is very precisely not what a reading is. As 
Geoffrey Bennington puts it: 
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Any reading, however respectful of the text being read ... takes place in this [inter-
pretive] opening, aod this is why texts are not messages and why the c lass ical concep-
tion of communication [Coleman 's paradigm of clear, no nonsense prose] is unhelpful 
discussing them .. . A text is a text only as at least minimally readable in this sense, and 
that means it can always be read differently with respect to the way it would (be 
wished) to be read. An absolutely respectful relation to a text would forbid one from 
even touching it. The ethics of reading would, then , consist in the negotiation of the 
margin opened by readability. 11 
In that sense, Bennington 's Derrida likens this necessary reading to an 
inheritance. For though inheritances exist Uust as a text, just as the his-
toricised past, exists for us .. . we by no means come from nowhere), and 
must thus be taken into account, an inheritance just wouldn't be an inher-
itance (nor a text a text nor the historicised past the hi storicised past) ~l 
we didn't necessarily pick and choose from it, a picking and choosing 
which, because one is never sure if the inheritance is complete to pick 
and choose from, is always itself incomplete: no picking and choosing, 
no reading, no interpretation, no appropriation, is ever quite right. And 
this is excellent, because it leaves, for example, historical reading as an 
endless task always before us, thus ruling out any total/totalising/totali-
tarian closure: the openness of all readings to future re-readings means 
that thi s open future guarantees an open past; the past cannot ever be 
fully settled because the future cannot be fully closed down. As Derrida 
puts this: 
An inheritance is never fully gathered; it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if 
there is one, can only consist in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing. You must I il 
faut] means you must filter, select, criticise; you must sort out among several of the 
possibilities which inhabit the same injunction. And inherit it in a contradictory fashion 
around a secret. If the legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal ; if it did not 
simultaneously call for and defy interpretation, one would never inherit from it. One 
would be affected by it as a cause - natural or genetic. One always inherits a secret 
which says 'Read me, wi ll you ever by up to it?' 12 
Will we ever be up to it? Will we ever achieve full presence; ever get total 
knowledge/ understanding? Of course not. But the point Den-ida is 
making is that the absence of a 'single unity of meaning' (the objective 
truth ... etc.) does not commit either him or anyone else to a recommen-
l l . Geoffrey Bennington, lnterr11p1i11f! Derrida (I ,ondon, Routledge, 2000) p. 36. 
12. l oi<l, p. 36. 
16 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 35, 2003 
dation of meaninglessness, nor does it mean the equivalence of the value 
of all readings - but rather, as Bennington argues, ' the singular ity of 
each' and the recognition that no one reading will ever be able to claim to 
have exhausted the textual resources of any text - including the historical 
past as text - being 'read' . 
(2) Jenkins is not an Academic Historian and Therefore . .. 
This charge is an old chestnut which, in effect, amounts to saying that 
since philosophers and theorists of history in general - and myself in par-
ticular - are invariably not empirical historians of an academic type, then 
we have no right, given our lack of practical experience, to criticise the 
methodological and craft practices of the professional historians who 
have. Against which at least two replies can be made. 
First, it is by no means the case that philosophers/theorists of hi story 
have no practical experience of doing history - unless one rules out as 
history the history of ideas, the history of mentalities and intellectual his-
tory more generally. But my second and main point against Coleman -
one expressed many years ago by R. F. Atkinson when responding to a 
similar charge against philosophers by Geoffrey Elton - is simply that it 
is totally beside the point if philosophers of hi story are 'practicing histo-
rians' or not. For philosophies of history - like philosophies of science or 
aesthetics or law - are discursive practices in their own right and do not 
derive their raison d'etre from serving another discourse. Consequently, 
Atkinson correctly argues that philosophers of history are not trying to be 
historians and that it is therefore ' of no necessary concern to them that 
their activities help, hinder or otherwise bear upon the practice'. Philoso-
phers interest themselves in history, he adds, 'for their own purposes: the 
instrumental value, or disvalue, of their investigations to history is 
wholly accidental' . 13 Atkinson is to the point. If history as a discourse -
as a piece of writing - is made up of metaphysical, ontological, episte-
mological, methodological, ethical and narratological aestheticisations, 
13. R.F. A tkinson, Knowledge and Expla11atiu11 in Hist01y (London, M acmi llan, 1978) pp. 7-8. 
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and if historians make claims to knowledge, then they cannot escape 
philosophical critiques of each of these constituent elements of their dis-
course nor the resultant status of their discourse as such. Which means, 
given that such critiques are leveled against historians 'practices' , that 
one cannot refute them merely by redescribing the very practice being 
held to account: a philosophical critique demands a philosophical 
defence: can Coleman give it? 
(3) On Metanarratives 
For Coleman, postmodernists stupidly contradict themselves when, in 
' their crusade [sic] to invalidate modernist history ' they themselves not 
only situate modernity 'historically' but often - and in my case all the 
time apparently - express such contextualisation by a classic use of the 
very metanarratives they revile: 'a vast metanarrative', writes Coleman, 
'is central to their own triumphalist view of postnwdernism'. Not for the 
first time, he adds, have I 'pointed to such gross inconsistency by evan-
gelists [sic] of the new postmodernist/anti-history order'; indeed, ' the 
very term "postmodern" is inherently historical'. Accordingly, he con-
cludes, 'the unreflexive use by Jenkins, Berkhofer, Ennarth, and others 
of such historical "lmowledge" suggests an insoluble problem in the post-
modern crusade [sicl against metanarrative. To even accuse modernist 
history of establishing metanarratives (which it obviously does ... ) is in 
itself to establish yet new metanarratives'. 14 
It is incredible to think anyone - let alone Coleman - can be so grossly 
ignorant of what passes conventionally for a metanarrative and then , 
secure in such ignorance, accuse poslmuuernisls uf nut knowing what 
they are doing. For whilst postmodernists do indeed construct narratives 
about phenomena, a nmTative is not the same thing as a metanarrative -
otherwise why two words? No, for a metanarrative to be a metanarrative 
it has to have an axiomatically held ground from which deductions are 
made yet which, being precisely meta (meta-physical), is beyond demon-
14. Michael Coleman, "Response to a Postmodernist . .. " op cit, pp. 53-4. 
18 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 35, 2003 
strable proof outside of its own terms whjch remajn unproblematicised: I 
would hope I don ' t have to remind Coleman why Hegelian Marxisms, 
Nietzschean wills to power and Freudian oedipal 'mythologies' are meta-
nan-atives. And, of course, insofar as academic history sometimes makes 
similar claims on 'given' axiomatic foundations, then in these "non-
refutable" instances, these too are metanaiTati ves. But postmodern narra-
tives are not of this type; they are, after Ankersmit, at best proposals 
about how things might be considered; they are, after Derrida (and I 
return to thi s in the last section) always interminably open and revisable, 
readable and re-readable. Nothing else is being claimed when postmod-
ernists ask people to consider their histories as interesting proposals, and 
such proposals are not - I mean are they - metanarratives? As to the 
related question of why, if postmodernists propose that we consider that 
we have come to the 'end of history' 'we' still use hi storical examples to 
argue this; well, the reply here is that, just as philosophers qua philoso-
phers talk, after Auschwitz (or Hegel) of ' the end of philosophy', and 
sociologists qua sociologists (such as Baumann) talk of ' the end of soci-
ology' so, as a 'historian of ideas', I can, until the actualisation of the end 
of rustory in the specific way I talk about this 'end ', use 'historical' and 
other discourses to try and explain this phenomenon. There is nothing 
paradoxical and certainly nothing contradictory here. 
( 4) Why do Postmodernists Hate Historians? 
In hi s book, Historical Representation, Frank Ankersmit reflects on his-
torians animosity towards theorists in general and postmodern ones in 
particular, and he offers the following explanatory 'proposal' fur it. 
'Deep in their hearts' , he writes, 
Historians feel more insecure about the scientific status of their discipline than the pra-
ctitioners of any other fie ld of scholarly research ... Deep in their hearts historians 
know that, in spite of all their emphasis on the duties of accurate investigation of 
sources and of prndent and responsible interpretation, history ranks lowest of all the 
disciplines that are taught at a university. Since one of the main effects of the historical 
theorists effort unfortunately is to confront the historian with these sad and disappo-
inting facts ... it is only natural that the historian tends to project frustration about the 
uncertainties of the discipline onto the theorist. In short, the historical theori st is the 
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historian 's obvious target for working off an all too understandable professional inferi-
ority complex. 15 
And above all - and surely Coleman must recognise himself here - that 
resentment particularly raises itself to consciousness when philosophers 
of history make claims about the ontological and epistemological status 
of the historicised past, academic style, 'on the basis of philosophised 
arguments only, without feeling cha11enged to find support for the . . . 
assertions in hard historical fact'; thus reducing, with their theorising, 'all 
the unwearying industry of the historian to mere irrelevant pedantry' or, 
at least, as producing 'material' they can happily critique out of episte-
mological existence. No wonder postmodernists are the ones who are 
hated. 
So, in aligning myself with Ankersmit's observations I would reverse 
the direction of the hatred Coleman discusses. 'What' , he asks postmod-
emists, is it ' about you that makes you so upset by us?' We, he adds, are 
not attempting to banish postmodern histories in the way postmodemists 
are trying to end modernity's historicising experiment: 'Turn self-criti-
cism upon yourselves, as you preach I sic l at us to do'. Coleman's lan-
guage here is desperate, an accusatory language that serves to save him 
admitting to himself the fact that postmodern theories have won the day 
and that he doesn't have the philosophical resources to refute them. Post-
modernists, then, are not the ones who hate Coleman(ists), rather it is 
they who are disliked as they point out the shortcomings of 'normal ' his-
torical practices and move on to new pastures. 
(5) But What About Using History For Emancipation? 
Will forgetting history be more or less emancipatory for women, 
African Americans, and other such previously 'invisible' groups, 
whose present struggles are at least partly justified through con-
structed histories of oppression (generally just(f!ed constructions, I 
believe?) ... Through the systematic efforts of male and female, white 
15. r. R. Ankcrsmit, op cit, p. 250. 
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and non-white historians, the 'outs' at last have come into history -
only to be threatened by expulsion from it by supposedly emancipated 
postmodernists ! 
Coleman, Response to a Postmodernist, p. 59 
Let me begin to answer this quote from Coleman by some quotes from 
Hayden White who, many years ago, responded to Gene Bell-Villada's 
critique of himself, a critique that is almost identical to Coleman 's pious 
offering, an offering which, had he been familiar with White's rebuttal 
(as he perhaps ought to be in his 'concern with theory') might have per-
suaded him not to bother with this particular protestation. Thus Bell-
Valada wrote against White: 
Meanwhile, in the face of a domestic socio-political panorama that begins to look vag-
uely 'Latin American', p lus certain South American 'friendly regimes' that behave 
more and more nazi-like, the only response that Lhe U.S. 'critical establishment' can 
come up with is its elaborate paralilerary schemes, its war on referentiality and its pre-
achments that 'History is Fiction, Trope and Discourse'. The families of several 
thousand Salvadoran death-squad victims may entertain other thoughts about history. 16 
To which White repli ed that, yes, no doubt the families alluded to do 
indeed have other thoughts about history than that it consists of fictions, 
tropes and discourse and, he adds, they would be 'as foolish as Bell-
Vilada apparently thinks I am if they even entertained such thoughts.' . 
But that is not, he continued, the point of issue. For whilst the histories 
the Salvadoran oppressed might need ('if they bother to think about his-
tory at all') will undoubtedly be about the experiences - both past and 
present - they have endured, in order to make sense of these experiences 
they will still have to be troped, made (be fictive) and 'discursive' . Con-
sequently a 'genuine' failure of 'historical understanding' occurs when 
one 'forgets that history, in the sense of both [previous] events and 
accounts of events, does not just happen but is made. Moreover, it is 
made on both sides of the bmTicades, and just as effectively by one side 
as by the other'. 
In the light of these comments - to which I'll return briefly in a few 
seconds - I personally have never said (and nor so far as I am aware has 
16. Hayden White, "Literary Theory and Histoiical Writing" in Figural !?ea/ism, op cit, pp. 1-26, p. 12. 
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White or Ankersmit, DeJTida or Foucault, Lyotard or Butler, Kristeva or 
Ermarth, et al), that people who are oppressed cannot, if they want, frame 
their resistances historically. And nor have I ever written a text that has 
not, openly and persistently, urged that histories - if people want them -
should be written precisely for emancipation and empowerment. Insofar, 
then, as the 'writing up' of the past into a history (with all the enabling 
Whitean meta-historical - not metanarrati ve - self awareness that is 
desirable) that wishes to make a difference in the present and the future is 
produced and distributed within a socio-economic-political moment 
where to have a history may help - where to have a history is still deemed 
necessary - then it would be ridiculous to ignore this: in the fight any 
weapon. But there are still two caveats to make. 
The first echoes White's point that ' legitimate histories' are always 
available on both sides-oron many sides - of the baJTicade(s). It would be 
nice, it would be easy, if the past/history was only on the side of the angels. 
But of course ' the past' knows of no sides; no angels, the 'past' will go with 
anyone, be hi stori cised into multiple meanings ad infinitum: the fact-value 
distinction and the aporia guarantee this. And second-and this is the posi-
tion essayed in my Why History? to which Coleman constantly refers - I 
think that, today, we might, in a culture that is arguably so a-historical, 
' forget history' and begin to live among those 'posts' that can further eman-
cipation. This is not to say that there are not hundreds of radical and eman-
cipatory histories out there - and Coleman's may be amongst them - but I 
just don't think they resonate in our culture the way 'postmodernist' works 
of a radical type do. Amongst the most illustrious of 'today 's' intellectuals 
- say Barthes, Foucault, DeJTida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Rorty, Fish, Butler, 
Ermarth, Kristeva, lragary, Cornell et al - none are historians. And so I 
have, precisely for the emancipatory purposes Coleman thinks I have 
ignored, pragmatically 'gone over ' to the 'posts' and left, on the whole, hi s-
torians behind in the way I would argue 'our' culture has. 
(7) Last Section 
Jn his article 'Deconstructions: The Im-possible', Derrida responds to the 
request to try and historicise the impact of deconstruction on the USA 
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'over the last twenty years'. Arguing that no such an account can ever be 
definitive, objective or true; arguing that every historical representation 
is always a 'failed representation' , he writes as follows: 
Since I cannot here reconstrnct all the topoi and movements of ... the last twenty years, 
you will allow me to propose, hypothetically, an emphasis . .. The emphasis would con-
cern a past periu<lhalion that I don't quite believe in , that lacks rigour in my opinion, 
but is not totally insignificant. Tn other words it would possess, without being rigor-
ously either true or fa lse, a certain appearance in its favour, and an appearance that we 
should take account of. 17 
'A certain appearance in its favour ' . This brief but brilliant encapsulation 
of ' the short-fall of the empirical', 'the short-fall of the epistemological', 
is as good as it gets. And it's good enough. Good enough in its recogni-
tion of the fact that all the decisions that I make in thinking about 'the 
before now' - metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, methodolog-
ical, ethical - are always radically undecidable and thus will always be 
ones about which I must have interminable doubts: no cut is ever clear-
cut. The logic of the aporia (and if 1 were to now try and define post-
modernism theoretically, I would argue that it is most plausibly the 'era 
of the raising to consciousness of the aporia') guarantees that our read-
ings have, at best, only a propositional status. But still I must (il faut) 
decide, interpret, appropriate, cut; make-up rules in the absence of rules 
and then offer up my proposal for a way of thinking about things . And 
this is the status of my reading of Coleman. I 'know', and I'm happy to 
know, that I'll never get Coleman 'right' . But I prefer my reading of post-
modernism and history and Jenkins to his reading of postmodernism and 
history and Jenkins, and I hope, for those who have bothered to read this 
'reply', that my side of the story has, at least, that certain appearance in 
its favour Derrida articulates. 
J 7. Jacques Derrida, "Deconstructions: The Im-possible" in Lotringer, S. & Cohen, S., Frenc/1 Theory in 
America, (London, Routledge, 2001) pp. 13-32, p. 22. 
